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Product market deregulation and employment outcomes : evidence from the German retail sector
Senftleben-König, Charlotte - 2014
This paper investigates the short- and medium-term effects of the deregulation of shopopening hours legislation on … a gradual deregulation of shop opening restrictions in most of Germany's sixteen federal states. The paper exploits … regional variation in the legislation in order to identify the effect product market deregulation has on retail employment. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010238361
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Competition and regulation in a differentiated good market
Fiocco, Raffaele - 2011
This paper addresses the issue of how to design the institutional structure of an industry which provides two differentiated products. One good is supplied by a regulated monopoly and the other is produced in a competitive (unregulated) segment. Two possible institutional patterns are compared....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009381768
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Regulatory risk under optimal incentive regulation
Strausz, Roland - 2009
The paper provides a tractable, analytical framework to study regulatory risk under optimal incentive regulation. Regulatory risk is captured by uncertainty about the policy variables in the regulator's objective function: weights attached to profits and costs of public funds. Results are as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003796198
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The optimal industry structure in a vertically related market
Fiocco, Raffaele - 2010
We consider a vertically related market characterized by downstream imperfect competition and by the monopolistic provision of an essential facility-based input, whose price is set by a social-welfare maximizing regulator. Our model shows that the regulatory knowledge about the cost for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003962960
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Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory model
Fiocco, Raffaele; Gilli, Mario - 2011
Within a standard three-tier regulatory model, a benevolent principal delegates to a regulatory agency two tasks: the supervision of the firm's (two-type) costs and the arrangement of a pricing mechanism. The agency may have an incentive to manipulate information to the principal to share the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009266952
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The regulation of interdependent markets
Fiocco, Raffaele; Scarpa, Carlo - 2011
We examine the issue of whether two monopolists which produce substitutable goods should be regulated by one (centralization) or two (decentralization) regulatory authorities, when the regulator(s) can be partially captured by industry. Under full information, two decentralized agencies - each...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009267036
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Consumer standards as a strategic device to mitigate ratchet effects in dynamic regulation
Fiocco, Raffaele; Strausz, Roland - 2012
Strategic delegation to an independent regulator with a pure consumer standard improves dynamic regulation by mitigating ratchet effects associated with short term contracting. A consumer standard alleviates the regulator's myopic temptation to raise output after learning the firm is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009625551
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A brand specific investigation of international cost shock threats on price and margin with a manufacturer-wholesaler-retailer model
Dannewald, Till; Hildebrandt, Lutz - 2008
In times of increasing oil prices and a weak dollar, European companies that focus their business on the US market may find themselves in a weak position. While many businesses can hedge this kind of risk by relocating production to the US, or employing financial remedies, these strategies may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003796133
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Short-term managerial contracts and cartels
Han, Martijn A. - 2012
This paper shows how a series of commonly observed short-term CEO employment contracts can improve cartel stability compared to a long-term employment contract. When a manager's short-term appointment is renewed if and only if the firm hits a certain profit target, then (i) defection from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009628399
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Strategic delegation improves cartel stability
Han, Martijn A. - 2012
Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) show that strategic delegation reduces firm profits in the one-shot Cournot game. Allowing for infinitely repeated interaction, strategic delegation can increase firm profits as it improves cartel stability. -- strategic delegation ; collusion ;...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009628403