Arbeitszeitwünsche von Beschäftigten rücken in der jüngsten Vergangenheit stärker in den Fokus der öffentlichen und wissenschaftlichen Debatte. Dabei kommen repräsentative Studien für Deutschland hinsichtlich der Frage von Über- und Unterbeschäftigung zu sehr unterschiedlichen bis...

To examine the influence of working hours on employees' satisfaction, this article uses a large, representative set of panel data from German households (GSOEP). The results show that high working hours and overtime in general do not lead to decreased satisfaction. Rather, increasing working...

To examine the influence of working hours on employees' satisfaction, this article uses a large, representative set of panel data from German households (GSOEP). The results show that high working hours and overtime in general do not lead to decreased satisfaction. Rather, increasing working...

We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...

Work-related stress can lead to substantial health problems and thereby result in immense costs for establishments. Therefore, the question as to what extent establishments contribute to their employees' stress levels is of great importance for firm performance. We investigate the relationship...

We analyse in what way co-determination affects non-compliance with the German minimum wage, which was introduced in 2015. The Works Constitution Act (WCA), the law regulating co-determination at the plant level, provides works councils with indirect means to ensure compliance with the statutory...

Using both household and linked employer-employee data for Germany, we assess the effects of non-union representation in the form of works councils on (1) individual sickness absence rates and (2) a subjective measure of personnel problems due to sickness absence as perceived by a firm's...

This paper considers the e effcts of a two-period interaction on the decision of a principal to delegate authority to a potentially biased but better informed agent. Compared to the (repeated) one-period case, the agent's first period actions may also signal his type which in turn impacts wages...

We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...

This paper considers the e effcts of a two-period interaction on the decision of a principal to delegate authority to a potentially biased but better informed agent. Compared to the (repeated) one-period case, the agent's first period actions may also signal his type which in turn impacts wages...