This paper studies the target projection dynamic, which is a model of myopic adjustment for population games. We put it into the standard microeconomic framework of utility maximization with control costs. We also show that it is well-behaved, since it satisfies the desirable properties: Nash...

This paper studies the target projection dynamic, which is a model of myopic adjustment for population games. We put it into the standard microeconomic framework of utility maximization with control costs. We also show that it is well-behaved, since it satisfies the desirable properties: Nash...

This paper presents an infinite-horizon version of intergenerational utilitarianism that is both satisfactorily complete and consistent. By studying discounted utilitarianism as the discount factor tends to one, we obtain a welfare criterion - limit-discounted utilitarianism - that combines...

This paper provides axiomatic descriptions of social welfare relations, defined on infinite streams of utility, that are consistent with the utilitarian criterion on subsets where maximizing aggregate utility has a clear interpretation: the streams, or their differences, are summable. Besides...

This paper provides two conditions of epistemic robustness, robustness to alternative best replies and robustness to non-best replies, and uses them to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies.

The Shapley-Ichiishi result states that a game is convex if and only if the convex hull of marginal vectors equals the core. In this paper we generalize this result by distinguishing equivalence classes of balanced games that share the same core structure. We then associate a system of linear...

Behavioral economics provides several motivations for the common observation that agents appear somewhat unwilling to deviate from recent choices: salience, inertia, the formation of habits, the use of rules of thumb, or the locking in on certain modes of behavior due to learning by doing. This...

In a large family of solution concepts for boundedly rational players - allowing players to be imperfect optimizers, but requiring that better responses are chosen with probabilities at least as high as those of worse responses - most of Thompson's inessential transformations for the strategic...

We provide characterizations of preferences representable by a Cobb-Douglas utility function.

In a strategic game, a curb set [Basu and Weibull, Econ. Letters 36 (1991) 141] is a product set of pure strategies containing all best responses ro every possible belief restricted to this set. Prep sets [Voorneveld, Games Econ. Behav. 48 (2004) 403] relax this condition by only requiring the...