Showing 1 - 10 of 122
We consider a two-player contest for a prize of common but uncertain value. We show that less resources are spent in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649250
This paper studies strategic delegation in two-player contests for an indivisible prize (as in, e.g. litigation) where one party's probability of winning is determined by the relative investments of both. Even though neither player stands to gain anything from the possibility of one player...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649161
This paper analyzes optimal insurance against unemployment and disability in a private information economy with endogenous health and search effort. Individuals can reduce the probability of becoming disabled by exerting, so-called, prevention effort, which is costly in terms of utility. A...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281214
This paper analyzes optimal insurance against unemployment and disability in a private information economy with endogenous health and search effort. Individuals can reduce the probability of becoming disabled by exerting, so-called, prevention effort, which is costly in terms of utility. A...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010643161
' preferences for new technology that improves contest accuracy. Modeling accuracy as the elasticity of "production" in a standard … Tullock contest, we show that players may be against higher accuracy if heterogeneity among them is:(1) sufficiently low; (2 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011381250
In Young (1993, 1998) agents are recurrently matched to play a finite game and almost always play a myopic best reply to a frequency distribution based on a sample from the recent history of play. He proves that in a generic class of finite n-player games, as the mutation rate tends to zero,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281156
It has been argued that having a contract market before the spot market enhances competition (Allaz and Vila, 1993 … contract markets reduces the market power of generators. In particular, we investigate the sensitivity of this result with … contract markets help sustain collusion on the spot market. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281160
We here develop a model of pre-play communication that generalizes the cheap-talk approach by allowing players to have a lexicographic preference, second to the payoffs in the underlying game, for honesty. We formalize this by way of an honesty (or truth) correspondence between actions and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281162
Saez-Marti and Weibull [4] investigate the consequences of letting some agents play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply in Young's [8] bargaining model. This is how they introduce cleverness of players. We analyze such clever agents in general finite two-player games. We show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281177
Sets closed under rational behavior were introduced by Basu and Weibull (1991) as subsets of the strategy space that contain all best replies to all strategy profiles in the set. We here consider a more restrictive notion of closure under rational behavior: a subset of the strategy space is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281178