wants to appear generous. Although non-monetary donations are always inefficient, our model predicts donors to favor non …-monetary donations when the inefficiency is relatively small and when the recipient is sufficiently rich. The model helps to explain the …

other. We show that altruism has a non-monotonic effect on effort. We study how this effect depends on climate, the …

We look at gender differences in preferences for altruism, risk and competition in math and word search among …

analyze how the equilibrium outcome depends on altruism and climate for ex ante identical individuals. We also consider (a …) coerced altruism, that is, situations where a social norm dictates how output be shared, (b) the effects of insurance markets …, and (c) the role of institutional quality. The evolutionary robustness of altruism is analyzed and we study how this …

mixture of true and coerced altruism between family members. We model families as pairs of siblings. Each sibling exerts … actuarially fair formal insurance. We show that coerced family altruism reduces individual efforts in equilibrium. However …, individuals always benefit ex ante from living in families with coerced altruism, as compared with living in autarky. We show that …

control treatment without feedback messages, donations increase substantially when recipients can communicate. With verbal … feedback, the fraction of zero donations decreases from about 40% to about 20%, and there is a corresponding increase in the …