Failures of government policies often provoke opposite reactions from citizens; some call for a reversal of the policy while others favor its continuation in stronger form. We offer an explanation of such polarization, based on a natural bimodality of preferences in political and economic...

Recent literature has questioned the existence of a learning foundation for the partially cursed equilibrium. This paper closes the gap by showing that a partially cursed equilibrium corresponds to a particular analogy-based expectation equilibrium. -- Analogy Expectations ; Bounded Rationality...

In a large family of solution concepts for boundedly rational players - allowing players to be imperfect optimizers, but requiring that "better" responses are chosen with probabilities at least as high as those of "worse" responses - most of Thompson's "inessential" transformations for the...

We study costless pre-play communication of intentions among inexperienced players. Using the level-k model of strategic thinking to describe players' beliefs, we fully characterize the effects of pre-play communication in symmetric 2×2 games. One-way communication weakly increases coordination...