This paper centres around the question of ownership of firms and managerial competition and how these affect manager and employees' incentives to invest in human capital. We argue that employee's incentives in human capital investment are affected by both ownership and competition since both...

In this paper the internal organisation of firms is reduced to the organisation of a communication network. In the presence of information communication and processing costs it is important to design rules guiding which members of the firm ought to communicate with one another on a regular...

This paper extends the classic two-armed bandit problem to a many-agent setting in which N players each face the same experimentation problem. The difference with the single-agent problem is that agents can now learn from the experiments of others. Thus, experiementation produces a public good...

In this paper the internal organisation of firms is reduced to the organisation of a communication network. In the presence of information communication and processing costs it is important to design rules guiding which members of the firm ought to communicate with one another on a regular...

This paper extends the classic two-armed bandit problem to a many-agent setting in which N players each face the same experimentation problem. The difference with the single-agent problem is that agents can now learn from the experiments of others. Thus, experiementation produces a public good...