Recent years have seen an explosion of scholarship on “personalized law.” Commentators foresee a world in which regulators armed with big data and machine learning techniques determine the optimal legal rule for every regulated party, then instantaneously disseminate their decisions via...

We consider securities markets in which economic interests in firms and shareholder voting rights are traded independently; such markets allow for "empty voters" who hold voting rights in a firm that exceed their economic interests. We demonstrate that, in such settings, competitive equilibria...

It is a core principle of antitrust law and theory that reduced market concentration lowers the risk of anticompetitive behavior. We demonstrate that this principle is fundamentally incomplete.Traditional models assume that firms interact only as competitors. We examine and model...

The foreign tax credit is a cornerstone of the United States’ international tax regime and enjoys broad bipartisan support. Yet despite its enduring popularity, careful analysis reveals that the foreign tax credit is surprisingly arbitrary. Taxes are creditable in their entirety or not at all,...

This document is a technical appendix containing supplemental information for the regressions that appear in Lynne L. Dallas & Jordan M. Barry, Long-Term Shareholders and Time-Phased Voting, 40 Del. J. Corp. L. 541 (2016), 'http://ssrn.com/abstract=2625926' http://ssrn.com/abstract=2625926

There are two basic reasons why a citizen may choose to engage in political activity: She may wish to achieve particular results (“extrinsic motivations”) or she may simply enjoy engaging in the political activity itself (“intrinsic motivations”). However, most citizens’ ability to...

The Coase Theorem predicts that, if there are no transaction costs, parties will always contract their way to an efficient outcome. Thus, no matter which legal rules society chooses, "Coasean bargains" will lead to efficient results. There are always some transaction costs. However, transaction...