This paper studies the effect of randomness in per-period matching on the long-run outcome of non-equilibrium adaptive processes. If there are many matchings between each strategy revision, the randomness due to matching will be small; our question is when a very small noise due to matching has...

This paper studies the way that word-of-mouth communication aggregates the information of individual agents. We find that the structure of the communication process determines whether all agents end up making identical choices, with less communication making this conformity more likely. Despite...

This paper studies agents who consider the experiences of their neighbors in deciding which of two technologies to use. We analyze two learning environments, one in which the same technology is optimal for all players and another in which each technology is better for some of them. In both...

This paper shows that larger auctions are more efficient than smaller ones, but that despite this scale effect, two competing and otherwise identical markets or auction sites of different sizes can coexist in equilibrium. We find that the range of equilibrium market sizes depends on the...

This paper studies whether agents must agglomerate at a single location in a class of models of two-sided interaction. In these models there is an increasing returns effect that favors agglomeration, but also a crowding or market-impact effect that makes agents prefer to be in a market with...

We show that the use of communications to coordinate equilibria generates a Nash-threats folk theorem in two-player games with “almost public†information. The results generalize to the <i>n</i>-person case. However, the two-person case is more difficult because it is not possible to sustain...

This essay discusses the field of behavioral economics, with a focus on the papers in <i>Advances in Behavioral Economics</i>. These papers show that there is a body of “behavioral facts†that is both economically significant and regular enough to be modeled. For the field to advance further,...

This paper studies the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with long- and short-run players and little discounting. Because the short-run players are unconcerned about the future, each equilibrium outcome is constrained to lie on their static reaction (best-response) curves. The natural...

Forecasts are said to be calibrated if the frequency predictions are approximately correct. This is a refinement of an idea first introduced by David Blackwell in 1955. We show that “<i>K</i>-initialized myopic strategies†are approximately calibrated when <i>K</i> is large. These strategies first...

Players choose an action before learning an outcome chosen according to an unknown and history-dependent stochastic rule. Procedures that categorize outcomes, and use a randomized variation on fictitious play within each category are studied. These procedures are “conditionally...