We consider an equilibrium search model with on-the-job search where Þrms set wages. If employers are perfectly aware of all workers job opportunities, then when an employee receives an outside job offer, it is optimal for their employer to try to retain them by matching the offer, so long as...

We develop and estimate an equilibrium job search model of worker careers, allowing for human capital accumulation, employer heterogeneity and individual-level shocks. Monthly wage growth is decomposed into the contributions of human capital and job search, within and between jobs. Human capital...

Most applications of Nash bargaining over wages ignore between-employer competition for labor services and attribute all of the workers' rent to their bargaining power. In this paper, we write and estimate an equilibrium model with strategic wage bargaining and on-the-job search and use it to...

We construct and estimate an equilibrium search model with on–the–job–search. Firms make take–it–or–leave–it wage offers to workers conditional on their characteristics and they can respond to the outside job offers received by their employees. Unobserved worker productive...