Harsanyi (1997) argues that, for normative issues, informed preferences should be used, instead of actual preferences or happiness (or welfare). Following his argument allowing him to move from actual to informed preferences to its logical conclusion forces us to use happiness instead. Where...

In the presence of substantial relative-income effects and environmental disruption effects, economic growth may be welfare-reducing even if each and all individuals are optimizing and eagerly trying to make more money and the government also maximizes the welfare of individuals by the choice of...

In the popularly used ranking method of peer rating, the exclusion of the evaluations/marks given to oneselves is intuitively appealing and has been actually practiced, since a person/university/country typically is biased in favor of itself. This short paper shows that this apparently...

Welfare economics is incomplete as it analyzes preference without going on to analyze welfare (or happiness) which is the ultimate objective. Preference and welfare may differ due to imperfect knowledge, imperfect rationality, and/or a concern for the welfare of others (non-affective altruism)....

Positive, but non-excessive discounting of future utilities to take account of possible non-realization/survival is not the dictatorship of the present, contrary to Chichilnisky's argument which is ingenious but contains a slip due to the improper treatment of infinity. As the probability of...