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The Banks set (1(4):295–306, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">1985</CitationRef>) is one of the more important concepts in voting theory since it tells us about the sophisticated outcomes of standard amendment voting procedures commonly in use throughout the English speaking world (and elsewhere as well). While the properties of the Banks...</citationref>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010998911
Regenwetter and Grofman [17] offer a probabilistic generalization of Sen's [25, 27] classic value restriction condition when individual preferences are linear orders. They provide necessary and sufficient conditions for transitive majority preferences on linear orders. They call these conditions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005369307
In this paper we introduce harmonic analysis (Fourier series) as a tool for characterizing the existence of Nash equilibria in two-dimensional spatial majority rule voting games with large electorates. We apply our methods both to traditional proximity models and to directional models. In the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005369472
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"Subset voting" denotes a choice situation where one fixed set of choice alternatives (candidates, products) is offered to a group of decision makers, each of whom is requested to pick a subset containing any number of alternatives. In the context of subset voting we merge three choice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005752949