The object of this paper is to propose a consistency test for an individual involved in collective choice process. Collective choice processes considered in the paper are those that transform individuals `tastes' - which reflect the self-interested view point of the individuals - into (social)...

We examine how allowing individuals to emigrate to pay lower taxes abroad changes the optimal non-linear income tax scheme in a Mirrleesian economy. An individual emigrates if his domestic utility is less than his utility abroad net of migration costs, utilities and costs both depending on...

In a model where individual incomes depend on the agents' characteristics, we provide characterizations of several redistribution mechanisms. These mechanisms are designed to eliminate the effects of characteristics that are to be considered "irrelevant", while preserving the influence of...

We develop an approach which escapes Arrow’s impossibility by relying on information about agents’ indifference curves instead of utilities. In a model where agents have unequal production skills and different preferences, we characterize social ordering functions which rely only on ordinal...

We analyze the equity properties of insurance premium schemes where agents are partitioned into groups with different average accident probabilities and each individual has to pay a premium according to the average probability of the group to which it belongs. In particular, we examine the...

We consider a simple production model and we assume that agents have unequal production skills which can in no way be attributed to their responsibility. We study how it is possible, if at all, to compensate for differential skills by applying Rawls's idea of a collective sharing in the benefits...