We present a series of experimental coordination games with a payoff-dominant and a risk-dominant Nash equilibrium. We examine in how far local interaction structures have effects on players' strategy choices. Our three major observations are the following: First, local interaction with open...

In public goods experiments where subjects may change groups, we observe a continual flight of the more cooperative subjects from the less cooperative ones. The less cooperative subjects attempt to enter cooperative groups in order to free-ride on their contributions.

In an experimental study the auction procedure of the fixed rate tender is investigated with which the main refinancing operation of the Eurosystem was carried out in the past. In June 2000 the fixed rate tender was replaced by the 'American' variable rate tender. This change was occasioned by...

In game-theoretical models with local interaction it is usually assumed that fixed local interaction structures are imposed exogenously and do not evolve during the course of the game. However, this assumption does not make much sense in economics. We model the evolution of interaction...

Monopolies are frequently characterized by the following allocation rule: if the total demand is not greater than the supply, each buyer receives her desired amount in full; and if the total demand exceeds the supply, the supply is distributed proportionally according to the individual desired...

A population of players is considered in which each agent can select her neighbors in order to play a 2x2 Hawk-Dove game with each of them. We design our experiment in continuous time where participants may change their Hawk-Dove action and/or their neighborhood at any point in time. We are...

It is not a secret that certain auction formats yield on average higher prices than others. The phenomenon that dynamic auctions are more likely to elicit higher bids than static one-shot auctions is often associated with the term ''auction fever.'' On a psychological level, we consider the...

In an experimental evolutionary game framework we investigate whether subjects end up in a socially efficient state. We examine two games, a game where the socially efficient state is also an equilibrium and a game which has no equilibrium in pure strategies at all. Furthermore, we distinguish...

Recent experimental results show that equilibrium selection in coordination games exhibits remarkable regularities. In the paper we analyze three important determinants for equilibrium selection, the size of the population of players, the number of periods during which players interact, and the...

In strategic decision situations, as they are modeled in games, the outcome of decisions depend on all decision-makers involved. In such situations people make different decisions when moving simultaneously compared to moving sequentially without knowledge of earlier moves. This is called the...