Subjects repeatedly played a three-player coordination game with a payoff-dominant and a risk-dominant equilibrium. Subjects interacting in fixed groups quickly coordinated on the payoff-dominant equilibrium, while those interacting with their neighbours around a circle eventually coordinated on...

We analyze local as well as global interaction and contagion in population games, using the formalism of neural networks. In contrast to much of the literature, a state encodes not only the frequency of play, but also the spatial pattern of play. Stochastic best response dynamics with logistic...

In recent work on non-cooperative network formation star-shaped networks play an important role. In a particular theoretical model of Bala and Goyal (2000) center-sponsored stars are the only strict Nash networks. In testing this theoretical model Falk and Kosfeld (2003) do not find any...

Some recent results on the evolution of conventions are reviewed. Concerning the theoretical part of the paper, we compare the traditional replicator dynamics approach (in the evolution of conventions) with the local interaction approach. Some new results on the coexistence of conventions are...

Inspired by the theoretical results on network formation by Bala and Goyal (2000) and experimental evidence by Plott and Callander (2002) and Falk and Kosfeld (2003) we design network formation experiments in discrete and continuous time. Particularly in the continuous time experiment, we...

We consider a finitely repeated coordination game with multiple Nash equilibria which can be Pareto-ranked. We present experimental evidence that the strategies actually selected during the course of the game crucially depend on the information given to the subjects about their opponents'...

We present an experiment where two players bargain with a third player. They can bargain either separately or form a joint venture to bargain collectively. Our theoretical benchmark solution predicts decentralized bargaining, as only one player has an interest in forming a joint venture....

Systematic experiments with distribution games (for a survey, see Roth, 1995) have shown that participants are strongly motivated by fairness and efficiency considerations. This evidence, however, results mainly from experimental designs asking directly for sharing monetary rewards. But even...

There is robust field data showing that a frequent and successful way of looking for a job is via the intermediation of friends and relatives. Here we want to test this experimentally. Participants first play a simple public goods game with two interaction partners ('friends'), and share...

We analyze dynamic local interaction in population games where the local interaction structure (modeled as a graph) can change over time: A stochastic process generates a random sequence of graphs. This contrasts with models where the initial interaction structure (represented by a deterministic...