We present a series of experimental coordination games with a payoff-dominant and a risk-dominant Nash equilibrium. We examine in how far local interaction structures have effects on players' strategy choices. Our three major observations are the following: First, local interaction with open...

In public goods experiments where subjects may change groups, we observe a continual flight of the more cooperative subjects from the less cooperative ones. The less cooperative subjects attempt to enter cooperative groups in order to free-ride on their contributions.

We present an experiment where two players bargain with a third player. They can bargain either separately or form a joint venture to bargain collectively. Our theoretical benchmark solution predicts decentralized bargaining, as only one player has an interest in forming a joint venture....

We asked subjects to submit strategies for playing a specific public good game. The strategies were then made to interact with each other in a computer simulation. afterwards, the subjects twice had the opportunity to revise and resubmit their strategies for a second and a third simulation...

In an experimental evolutionary game framework we investigate whether subjects end up in a socially efficient state. We examine two games, a game where the socially efficient state is also an equilibrium and a game which has no equilibrium in pure strategies at all. Furthermore, we distinguish...

Recent experimental results show that equilibrium selection in coordination games exhibits remarkable regularities. In the paper we analyze three important determinants for equilibrium selection, the size of the population of players, the number of periods during which players interact, and the...

Subjects repeatedly played a three-player coordination game with a payoff-dominant and a risk-dominant equilibrium. Subjects interacting in fixed groups quickly coordinated on the payoff-dominant equilibrium, while those interacting with their neighbours around a circle eventually coordinated on...

We examine the behavior of subjects in a simple principal-agent game with hidden action. While subjects in the role of agents tend to choose the actions which maximize their expected profits, subjects in the role of principals offer contracts which differ from the theoretical predictions. We...

When collective agreements apply to all employees, whether unionized or not, what is the rationale behind joining a union? The paper presents an experiment on a two-stage game. In the first stage, the decision to join a union is modeled as a voluntary contribution to a public good. In the second...

In an experimental 2x2 coordination game with two strict equilibria we observe that, in contrast to equilibrium selection theory (Harsanyi and Selten 1988), only half of the subjects choose the strategy that relates to the payoff- and risk-dominant equilibrium. We propose modified risk dominance...