This is the first book to comprehensively examine the asymptotic behavior of dynamic monopolies, duopolies, and oligopolies where firms face information and implementation delays. It considers discrete and continuous timescales, continuously distributed delays, as well as single and multiple...

This book focuses on the latest advances in nonlinear dynamic modeling in economics and finance, mainly—but not solely—based on the description of strategic interaction by using concepts and methods from dynamic and evolutionary game theory. The respective chapters cover a range of...

This paper examines a Markovian model for the optimal irreversible investment problem of a firm aiming at minimizing total expected costs of production. We model market uncertainty and the cost of investment per unit of production capacity as two independent one-dimensional regular diffusions,...

A problem of optimally purchasing electricity at a real-valued spot price (that is, with potentially negative cost) has been recently addressed in De Angelis, Ferrari and Moriarty (2015) [SIAM J. Control Optim. 53(3)]. This problem can be considered one of irreversible investment with a cost...

Motivated by recent path-breaking contributions in the theory of repeated games in continuous time, this paper presents a family of discrete-time games which provides a consistent discrete-time approximation of the continuous-time limit game. Using probabilistic arguments, we prove that...

We derive a new equation for the optimal investment boundary of a general irreversible investment problem under exponential Lévy uncertainty. The problem is set as an infinite time-horizon, two-dimensional degenerate singular stochastic control problem. In line with the results recently...

We consider a class of non-cooperative N-player non-zero-sum stochastic differential games with singular controls, in which each player can affect a linear stochastic differential equation in order to minimize a cost functional which is quadratic in the state and linear in the control. We call...