This volume offers a comprehensive state-of-the-art portrait of entrepreneurship and small business management issues in former Yugoslavian countries. Further, it provides a wealth of theoretical and empirical evidence on the role of entrepreneurship in transition economies and emerging markets....

A collections of essays in honour of Branko Horvat, an economist and social thinker of great international reputation from former Yugoslavia and nowadays Croatia. The essays deal with themes related to Horvat's own work, namely equality, social justice, employee participation, labour management,...

This publication examines how drug originator manufacturers manage to shield their products from competition. It characterizes the pharmaceutical industry in detail and analyzes actions that violate antitrust laws in the USA and/or the European Union. The publication examines, for example,...

Spieltheoretische Betrachtung von Oligopolen und Kollusion in Kontraktmärkten -- Experimentelle Untersuchung zum Einfluss von Monitoring, Kommunikation, Absprachetypen und Markthistorie auf Kollusion -- Statistische Hypothesenüberprüfung anhand einer Inhaltsanalyse und multivariaten...

Foreword to the Two-Volume Series -- Introduction to This Study -- Introduction to Part I: Basic Concepts and Approaches -- Chapter 1: The “Correct” Definition of “the Impact of a Choice on Economic Efficiency” -- Chapter 2: The Components of the Difference Between a Firm’s Price and...

Introduction to This Study: This Study’s Coverage and Distinctive Features -- Chapter 12: Horizontal Mergers and Acquisitions -- Chapter 13: Conglomerate Mergers and Acquisitions -- Chapter 14: Vertical Mergers and the Pricing Techniques, Contract-of-Sale Provisions, and Sales-Policies That...

Infolge aktueller Entwicklungen in der Kartellrechtspraxis wird das Preisbindungsverbot derzeit wieder kontrovers unter Vertretern der Rechtswissenschaft, der Wettbewerbstheorie und der Betriebswirtschaftslehre diskutiert. Benjamin C. Schefer analysiert in diesem Zusammenhang die...

The book deals with collusion between firms on both sides of a market that is immune to deviations by coalitions. We study this issue using an infinitely countably repeated game with discounting of future single period payoffs. A strict strong perfect equilibrium is the main solution concept...