Following the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord of March 3, 1951, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) focused on free reserves - the difference between excess reserves (reserve deposits in excess of reserve requirements) and borrowed reserves - as the touchstone of U.S. monetary policy....

The nineteenth-century economist Walter Bagehot maintained that in order to prevent bank panics, a central bank should provide liquidity at a very high rate of interest. However, most of the theoretical literature on liquidity provision suggests that central banks should lend at an interest rate...

The nineteenth-century economist Walter Bagehot maintained that in order to prevent bank panics a central bank should provide liquidity to the market at a very high rate of interest. This recommendation seems to be in sharp contrast with the policy adopted by the Federal Reserve after September...

The naming of eleven banks as “too big to fail (TBTF)” in 1984 led bond raters to raise their ratings on new bond issues of TBTF banks about a notch relative to those of other, unnamed banks. The relationship between bond spreads and ratings for the TBTF banks tended to flatten after that...

We present an incomplete markets model to understand the costs and benefits of increasing government debt in a low interest rate environment. Higher risk increases the demand for safe assets, lowering the natural rate of interest below zero, constraining monetary policy at the zero lower bound,...

This paper presents a history of the primary dealer system from the late 1930s to the early 1950s. The paper focuses on two formal programs: the "recognized" dealer program adopted by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in 1939 and the "qualified" dealer program adopted by the Federal Open...

To combat the financial crisis that intensified in the fall of 2008, the Federal Reserve injected a substantial amount of liquidity into the banking system. The resulting increase in reserve balances exerted downward price pressure in the federal funds market, and the effective federal funds...

Standard sticky information pricing models successfully capture the sluggish movement of aggregate prices in response to monetary policy shocks but fail at matching the magnitude and frequency of price changes at the micro level. This paper shows that in a setting where firms choose when to...

We present a model in which temporary shocks can permanently scar the economy's productive capacity. Unemployed workers lose skill and are expensive to retrain, generating multiple steady state unemployment rates. Large temporary shocks push the economy into a liquidity trap, generating...

We analyze the impact of aggregate reserve levels on the intraday behavior of the federal funds rate over a sample period extending from 2002 to 2005. We study both how the reserve levels accumulated earlier in a maintenance period influence the morning level of the funds rate relative to the...