We propose a new interest rate rule that implements the optimal equilibrium and eliminates all indeterminacy in a canonical New Keynesian model in which the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates (ZLB) is binding. The rule commits to zero nominal interest rates for a length of time that...

I give necessary and sufficient conditions under which interest-rate feedback rules eliminate aggregate instability by inducing a globally unique optimal equilibrium in a canonical New Keynesian economy with a binding zero lower bound. I consider a central bank that initially keeps interest...

This paper proposes a simple framework for analyzing a continuum of monetary policy rules characterized by differing degrees of credibility, in which commitment and discretion become special cases of what we call quasi commitment. The monetary policy authority is assumed to formulate optimal...

We propose a theory to explain why, and under what circumstances, a politician endogenously gives up rent and delegates policy tasks to an independent agency. Applied to monetary policy, this theory (i) formalizes the rationale for delegation highlighted by Alexander Hamilton, the first...

This paper considers a general class of nonlinear rational-expectations models in which policymakers seek to maximize an objective function that may be household expected utility. We show how to derive a target criterion that is 1) consistent with the model's structural equations, 2) strong...

Countries' concerns about the value of their currency have been studied and documented extensively in the literature. Capital controls can be - and often are - used as a tool to manage exchange rate fluctuations. This paper investigates whether countries can benefit from using such a tool. We...

There is a new and now large literature analyzing government policies for financial stability based on models with endogenous borrowing constraints. These normative analyses build upon the concept of constrained efficient allocation, where the social planner is constrained by the same borrowing...

Lack of commitment in monetary policy leads to the well known Barro-Gordon inflation bias. In this paper, we argue that two phenomena associated with the time inconsistency problem have been overlooked in the exchange rate debate. We show that, absent commitment, independent monetary policy can...

This paper reconsiders the cost of business cycles under incomplete markets. Primarily, we focus on the heterogeneity in the cost of business cycles among agents with different skill levels. Unskilled workers are subject to a much larger risk of unemployment during recessions than are skilled...

We study the role of commitment in a version of the Diamond and Dybvig (JPE, 1983) model with no aggregate uncertainty. As is well known, the banking authority can eliminate the possibility of a bank run by committing to suspend payments to depositors if a run were to start. We show, however,...