A fundamental conclusion drawn from the recent financial crisis is that the supervision and regulation of financial firms in isolation — a purely microprudential perspective — are not sufficient to maintain financial stability. Rather, a macroprudential perspective, which evaluates and...

How does the belief that policymakers will bail out investors in the event of a crisis affect the allocation of resources and the stability of the financial system? I study this question in a model of financial intermediation with limited commitment. When a crisis occurs, the efficient policy...

This paper explores the advantages of a new financial charter for large, complex, internationally active financial institutions that would address the corporate governance challenges of such organizations, including incentive problems in risk decisions and the complicated corporate and...

Banks' leverage choices represent a delicate balancing act. Credit discipline argues for more leverage, while balance-sheet opacity and ease of asset substitution argue for less. Meanwhile, regulatory safety nets promote ex post financial stability, but also create perverse incentives for banks...

We find evidence that the Federal Reserve stress tests (CCAR and DFAST) produce information about the stress-tested firms as well as other, non-stress-tested banking companies. Although standard event studies do not always show abnormal returns for the stress-tested sample on average, we argue...

A 2012 paper by Goodhart, Kashyap, Tsomocos, and Vardoulakis (GKTV) proposes a dynamic general equilibrium framework that provides a conceptual - and to some extent quantitative - framework for the analysis of macroprudential policies. The distinguishing feature of GKTV's paper relative to any...

While the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) broadens the regulatory reach to reduce systemic risks to the U.S. financial system, it does not address some important risks that could migrate to or emanate from entities outside the federal safety net. At the same time, it limits the types of interventions by...

Does the intensity of supervision affect quantifiable outcomes at supervised firms? We develop a novel proxy to identify plausibly exogenous variation in the intensity of supervision across large U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs), based on the size rank of a BHC within its Federal Reserve...

We study bank supervision by combining a theoretical model that distinguishes supervision from regulation and a novel dataset on work hours of Federal Reserve supervisors. We highlight the trade-offs between the benefits and costs of supervision and use the model to interpret the relationship...

We measure bank supervision using the database of supervisory issues, known as matters requiring attention or immediate attention, raised by Federal Reserve examiners to banking organizations. The volume of supervisory issues increases with banks' asset size, especially for the largest and most...