We derive equilibrium pricing implications from an intertemporal capital asset pricing model where the tightness of financial intermediaries’ funding constraints enters the pricing kernel. We test the resulting factor model in the cross-section of stock returns. Our empirical results show that...

Standard factor pricing models do not capture well the common time-series or cross-sectional variation in average returns of financial stocks. We propose a five-factor asset pricing model that complements the standard Fama and French (1993) three-factor model with a financial sector ROE factor...

Agency mortgage backed securities (MBS) with diverse characteristics are traded in parallel with individualized contracts in the specified pool (SP) market and with standardized contracts in the to-be-announced (TBA) market. We find that this unique parallel trading environment significantly...

We estimate the cost of capital for the banking industry and find that while the cost of capital soared for banks in the financial crisis, after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the value-weighted cost of capital for banks fell differentially more than did the cost of capital for nonbanks. The...

We propose a nonparametric Bayesian approach for conducting inference on probabilistic surveys. We use this approach to study whether U.S. Survey of Professional Forecasters density projections for output growth and inflation are consistent with the noisy rational expectations hypothesis. We...

Most mortgages in the United States are securitized through the agency mortgage-backedsecurities (MBS) market. These securities are generally traded on a “to-be-announced,” or TBA, basis. This trading convention significantly improves agency MBS liquidity, leading to lower borrowing costs...

Banks' leverage choices represent a delicate balancing act. Credit discipline argues for more leverage, while balance-sheet opacity and ease of asset substitution argue for less. Meanwhile, regulatory safety nets promote ex post financial stability, but also create perverse incentives for banks...

This paper examines market liquidity in the post-crisis era in light of concerns that regulatory changes might have reduced dealers' ability and willingness to make markets. We begin with a discussion of the broader trading environment, including an overview of regulations and their potential...

We provide empirical evidence for the existence, magnitude, and economic impact of stigma associated with banks borrowing from the Federal Reserve's discount window facility. We find that, during the height of the financial crisis, banks were willing to pay an average premium of at least 37...

Banks hold liquid and illiquid assets. An illiquid bank that receives a liquidity shock sells assets to liquid banks in exchange for cash. We characterize the constrained efficient allocation as the solution to a planner's problem and show that the market equilibrium is constrained inefficient,...