I study rollover risk in the wholesale funding market when intermediaries can hold liquidity ex ante and are subject to fire sales ex post. Precautionary liquidity restores multiple equilibria in a global rollover game. An intermediate liquidity level supports both the usual run equilibrium and...

We propose a tractable, model-based stress-testing framework where the solvency risks, funding liquidity risks and market risks of banks are intertwined. We highlight how coordination failure between a bank's creditors and adverse selection in the secondary market for the bank's assets interact,...

How does asset encumbrance affect the fragility of intermediaries subject to rollover risk? We offer a model in which a bank issues covered bonds backed by a pool of assets that is bankruptcy remote and replenished following losses. Encumbering assets allows a bank to raise cheap secured debt...

In the months preceding the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, banks were willing to pay a premium over the Federal Reserve's discount window (DW) rate to participate in the much less flexible Term Auction Facility (TAF). We empirically test the predictions of a new signalling model...

Bank liability guarantee schemes have traditionally been viewed as costless measures to shore up investor confidence and prevent bank runs. However, as the experiences of some European countries, most notably Ireland, have demonstrated, the credibility and effectiveness of these guarantees are...

We study how changes in prudential requirements affect cross-border lending of Canadian banks by utilizing an index that aggregates adjustments in key regulatory instruments across jurisdictions. We show that when a destination country tightens local prudential measures, Canadian banks lend more...

We examine the effect of ex-post information contagion on the ex-ante level of systemic risk defined as the probability of joint bank default. Because of counterparty risk or common exposures, bad news about one bank reveals valuable information about another bank, triggering information...

This paper studies monetary policy in an economy where banks make risky loans to firms and provide liquidity services in the form of deposits to households. For given bank equity, market discipline implies that banks can take more deposits when assets are safer or more profitable. Banks respond...

This paper studies a dynamic version of the Holmstrom-Tirole model of intermediated finance. I show that competitive equilibria are not constrained efficient when the economy experiences a financial crisis. A pecuniary externality entails that banks' desire to accumulate capital over time...