This paper builds a model with imperfect competition in the banking sector. In the model, banks issue deposits and make loans, and deposits can be used as payment instruments by households. We use the model to assess the general equilibrium effects of introducing a central bank digital currency...

Many central banks are contemplating whether to issue a central bank digital currency (CDBC). CDBC has certain potential benefits, including the possibility that it can bear interest. However, using CBDC is costly for agents, perhaps because they lose their anonymity when using CBDC instead of...

We use a method similar to Google’s PageRank procedure to rank banks in the Canadian Large Value Transfer System (LVTS). Along the way we obtain estimates of the payment processing speeds for the individual banks. These differences in processing speeds are essential for explaining why observed...

We present a model of central bank collateralized lending to study the optimal choice of the haircut policy. We show that a lending facility provides a bundle of two types of insurance: insurance against liquidity risk as well as insurance against downside risk of the collateral. Setting a...

Should a central bank digital currency (CBDC) be issued? Should its design be cash- or depositlike? To answer these questions, we theoretically and quantitatively assess the effects of a CBDC on consumption, banking and welfare. Our model introduces new general equilibrium linkages across...

This paper predicts households' demand for a central bank digital currency (CBDC) with different design attributes by applying a structural demand model to a unique Canadian survey dataset. CBDC and its close alternatives, cash and demand deposits, are viewed as product bundles of different...

We use a simple model to study whether private payment systems based on bank deposits can provide the optimal level of safety. In the model, bank deposits backed by projects are subject to default risk that can be mitigated by a depositor's ex ante and ex post monitoring. Safe payment...

This paper investigates how the introduction of an interest-bearing central bank digital currency (CBDC) that serves as a perfect substitute for bank deposits as an electronic means of payment affects monetary policy pass-through. When the deposit market is not fully competitive, the CBDC tends...

To what extent does a central bank digital currency (CBDC) compete with bank deposits? To answer this question, we develop and estimate a structural model where each household chooses which financial institution to deposit their digital money with. Households value the interest paid on digital...

This paper uncovers trends in payment timing in Canada's Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) from 2003 to 2011. Descriptive analysis shows that LVTS payment activity has not been peaking in the late afternoon since 2008, and the improvement was most significant in 2009. Ordinary least squares...