This paper analyses the management of the Atlantic salmon stocks in the Baltic Sea through a coalition game in the partition function form. The signs of economic and biological over-exploitation of these salmon stocks over the last two decades indicate that cooperation among the harvesting...

International agreements are necessary for exclusion of non-cooperative behavior. We parameterized an age-structured model for the North Sea herring fishery. The reference points of the current harvest control rule operationalize the precautionary approach. Applying the precautionary approach by...

In this paper, we simulate how an increase in the productivity of the North-East Arctic cod fishery affects Russian–Norwegian cooperation on fish stock management. We link the productivity increase to sea environmental conditions and climate change through a temperature-dependent,...

This paper investigates the stability of agreements for sharing fish stocks among coastal states when migrations patterns change — a heretofore largely unexplored topic. The case investigated is the agreement on sharing the mackerel stock (<italic>Scomber scombrus</italic>) in the North-east Atlantic Ocean....

Game-theoretic models of fisheries typically consider cases where some players harvest a single common fish stock. However, these types of models do not capture many real-world mixed fisheries, where species can be biologically independent or dependent. The present paper considers cases where...