This paper estimates the interaction between monetary- and fiscal policy using a structural VAR model with time-varying parameters. For demand and supply shocks, the two policies are estimated to be complementary, while for monetary and fiscal policies shocks the two policies act as substitutes....

We reconsider the role of an inflation conservative central banker in a setting with distortionary taxation. To do so, we assume monetary and fiscal policy are decided by independent authorities that do not abide to past commitments. If the two authorities make policy decisions simultaneously,...

How willing are individual primary dealers to alter their offered yields in central bank quantitative easing auctions of government bonds in order to sell an additional share of the outstanding amount of a bond to the central bank? This question is of great importance for a central bank's...

We introduce time-varying systemic risk (à la He and Krishnamurthy, 2014) in an otherwise standard New-Keynesian model to study whether simple leaning-against-the-wind interest rate rules can reduce systemic risk and improve welfare. We find that while financial sector leverage contains...

In this paper, we evaluate the consequences of super-active fiscal policy rules - that is, rules that call for tax cuts and/or spending increases as the government's debt level rises - in a standard New Keynesian model subject to an occasionally-binding zero lower bound on the monetary policy...

I study the welfare performance of a policy regime of fiscal activism in which fiscal policy acts as an automatic stabilizer and controls inflation, while monetary policy pegs the nominal interest rate. When evaluated through the lens of a standard New Keynesian model, accounting for price and...

Yes, it makes a lot of sense. This paper studies how to design simple loss functions for central banks, as parsimonious approximations to social welfare. We show, both analytically and quantitatively, that simple loss functions should feature a high weight on measures of economic activity,...

We define and study transparency, credibility, and reputation in a model where the central bank's characteristics are unobservable to the private sector and are inferred from the policy outcome. A low-credibility bank optimally conducts a more expansionary policy than a high-credibility bank, in...

Continuos credibility effects are incorporated into a simple model of optimal monetary policy. The resulting model provides explanations for a number of folk theorems about credibility in monetary policy. A central bank with low initial credibility pursues a more restrictive policy than a...

Using an empirical New-Keynesian model with optimal discretionary monetary policy, we calibrate key parameters - the central bank's preference parameters; the degree of forward-looking behavior in the determination of inflation and output; and the variances of inflation and output shocks - to...