A string of theoretical papers shows that the non-exclusivity of credit contracts generates important negative contractual externalities. Employing a unique dataset, we identify how these externalities affect the supply of credit. Using internal information on a creditor's willingness to lend,...

We study how a bank's willingness to lend to a previously exclusive firm changes once the firm obtains a loan from another bank (“outside loan”) and breaks an exclusive relationship. Using a difference-in-difference analysis and a setting where outside loans are observable, we document that...

We study 52 million trade credit contracts, issued by 51 suppliers over 9 years to about 199,000 unique customers. The data contain information on contract size, due dates, actual time to payment, and firm characteristics. Our empirical analysis contradicts the conventional view that trade...

Using data on exogenous liquidity losses generated by the fraud and failure of a cash-intransit firm, we demonstrate a causal impact on firms' trade credit usage. We find that firms manage liquidity shortfalls by increasing the amount of drawn credit from suppliers and decreasing the amount...

We empirically investigate the proposition that firms charge premia on cash prices in transactions involving trade credit. Using a comprehensive Swedish panel dataset on product-level transaction prices and firm-characteristics, we relate trade credit issuance to price setting. In a recession...

We demonstrate improvements in predictive power when introducing spline functions to take account of highly non-linear relationships between firm failure and earnings, leverage, and liquidity in a logistic bankruptcy model. Our results show that modeling excessive non-linearities yields...

We quantify the importance of trade credit chains for the propagation of corporate bankruptcies. Our results show that trade creditors (suppliers) that issue more trade credit are more exposed to trade debtor (customer) failures, both in terms of the likelihood of experiencing a debtor failure...