Evidence suggests that banks tend to lend a lot during booms, and very little during recessions. We propose a simple explanation for this phenomenon. We show that, instead of dampening productivity shocks, the banking sector tends to exacerbate them, leading to excessive fluctuations of credit,...

This article examines how fi rms facing volatile input prices and holding some degree of market power in their product market link their risk management with their production or pricing strategies. This issue is relevant in many industries ranging from manufacturing to energy retailing, where...

The majority of academic economists share the view that a corporation should serve the exclusive interests of its shareholders (shareholder value maximization). This view is fi rmly grounded on the extension, by Arrow (1953) and Debreu (1959) of the two welfare theorems to production economies...

We develop a novel dynamic model of banking showing that aggregate bank capital is an important determinant of bank lending. In our model commercial banks finance their loans with deposits and equity, while facing equity issuance costs. Because of this financial friction, banks build equity...

We present an overview of corporate-finance models where firms are subject to exogenous market frictions. These models, albeit quite simple, yield reasonable predictions regarding financing, pay-outs and default, as well as asset-pricing implications. The price to pay for the said simplicity is...

We argue that risk sharing motivates the bank-wide structure of bonus pay. In the presence of financial frictions that make external financing costly, the optimal contract between shareholders and employees involves some degree of risk sharing whereby bonus pay partially absorbs earnings shocks....

We integrate bank and bond financing into a two-sector neoclassical growth model to examine the stabilization effect of endogenous bank leverage adjustment. We show that although bank leverage amplifies shocks, the increase of leverage to a decline in bank equity is an automatic stabilizer in...

When a bank is burdened with Non Performing Loans, an underinvestment problem may arise. Banking Authorities often take the initiative to segregate these Non Performing Loans into a Bad Bank (BB), so that the remaining part of the bank, the Good Bank, finds it profitable to make new loans. These...