We model a two-tiered market structure in which an investor can trade an asset on a trading platform with a set of dealers who in turn have access to an interdealer market. The investor's order is informative about the asset's payoff and dealers who were contacted by the investor use this...

I develop a noisy rational expectations equilibrium model with a continuum of states and a full set of options that render the market complete. I show a major difference in equilibrium behaviour between models with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and non-CARA preferences. First, when...

Large investors often advertise private information at private talks or in the media. To analyse the incentives for information disclosure, I develop a two-period Kyle (1985) type model in which an informed short-horizon investor strategically discloses private information to enhance price...

I model a market in which a trader with superior information about an asset is subject to careful scrutiny by another agent who immediately observes the trading decisions of the informed agent with some noise and engages in (klepto)parasitic behavior by imicking the informed trader and trading...

We use novel data on individual activity in a sports betting market to study the effect of past performance sequences on individual behavior in a real market. The revelation of fundamental values in this market enables us to disentangle whether behavior is caused by sentiment or by superior...

We analyze the risk levels chosen by agents who have private information regarding their quality, and whose performance will be judged and rewarded by outsiders. Assume that risk choice is observable. Even risk-neutral agents will choose risk strategically to enhance their expected reputation....

We develop a two-period general equilibrium model of portfolio delegation with competitive, differentially skilled managers and convex compensation contracts. We show that convex incentives lead to significant equilibrium mispricing, but reduce price volatility. In particular, price...

How does private information get incorporated into option prices? To study this question, I develop a non-linear, noisy rational expectations equilibrium model with asymmetric information and a full menu of call and put options available for trading. The model allows for an arbitrary...

On October 26, 2008, Porsche announced a largely unexpected domination plan for Volkswagen. The resulting short squeeze in Volkswagen's stock briefly made it the most valuable listed company in the world. We argue that this was a manipulation designed to save Porsche from insolvency and the...

I study short-sale constraints in a market with asymmetric information. I offer a novel approach endogenizing short-sale constraints by including an asset-borrowing market in my model. Short-sellers have to borrow an asset and therefore reveal information to a lender. The lender trades on her...