We develop a model of investment, payout, and financing policies in which firms face uncertainty regarding their ability to raise funds and have to search for investors when in need of capital. We show that capital supply uncertainty leads firms to value financial slack and to adjust their...

Equity research analysts tend to cover firms about which they have favorable views. We exploit this tendency to infer analysts' preferences for corporate policies from their coverage decisions. We then use exogenous analyst disappearances to examine the effect of these preferences on corporate...

This paper documents that underpriced firms substitute R&D spending with share buybacks to the detriment of innovation. To identify underpriced firms, I introduce a novel measure of non-fundamental price pressure induced by indirect exposure to industry-level shocks. This measure addresses...

Making use of a structural model that allows for optimal liquidity management, we study the role that repos play in a bank's financing structure. In our model the bank's assets consist of illiquid loans and liquid reserves and are financed by a combination of repos, long–term debt, deposits...

We consider an economy populated by CARA investors who trade, accounting for their price impact, multiple risky assets with arbitrary distributed payoffs. We propose a constructive solution method: finding the equilibrium reduces to solving a linear ordinary differential equation. With market...

We challenge the view that short-term debt curbs moral hazard and analytically demonstrate that, in a world with financing frictions and fair debt pricing, short-term debt increases incentives for risk-taking. To do so, we develop a model in which firms are financed with equity and short-term...

I show that an asset pricing model for the equity claims of a value-maximizing firm can be constructed from its optimal financial contracting behavior. I study a dynamic contracting model in which firms trade off the costs and benefits of a given promise to pay external lenders in a specific...