We study the shareholder value implications of a shift in the corporate balance of power towards shareholders. We find that in response to an unanticipated event that made it likely that an annual binding shareholder vote on management pay would become compulsory for Swiss public companies, the...

This paper explores the idea that the speed with which equity prices reflect any benefits or costs of voluntary disclosure quality (VDQ) varies across firms. We find that for firms where we expect informational efficiency to be high, VDQ is not associated with returns beyond those available...

This article examines the recent regulatory developments with regard to short selling. We begin with a comprehensive compilation of emergency restrictions on short selling adopted in the current crisis. Because of the tendency of some regulators to retain certain restrictions permanently, it is...

This paper analyzes the independence of boards of directors as an optimally chosen, non-contractible behavior. A board behaves loyally to a CEO when it agrees to a negative NPV-project, giving the CEO private benefits. While the CEO benefits from competent directors because they help him make...

Seminal work in finance, economics, and psychology has documented that individuals tell the truth more often than standard economic models predict. But researchers have so far only indirectly inferred a preference for truth-telling from agents’ observed behavior. Using experiments, we explore...

Recent organizational theories suggest that there is a tradeoff between loyalty and competence. This paper tests several such theories in the context of public agencies. Prime ministers, chancellors, and kings alike need to secure the (efficient or inefficient) loyalty of their agencies, such as...

Executive compensation has increased dramatically over the past 15 years, but so has forced CEO turnover. We argue that part of the development of CEO pay can be explained by the adverse consequences that forced turnover implies for a CEO. We ¯nd that for the CEOs of the largest US...

This paper develops a dynamic trade-off model of optimal capital structure that takes into ac- count the fact that most firms have both invested assets and growth opportunities. These two sources of value react quite differently to business cycle risk. In particular, growth options are more...

This paper studies the extent to which risk-taking incentives of CEOs and other governance features in a range of years prior to the recent financial crisis were related to the write-downs of U.S. financial institutions during the crisis. We document that institutions whose CEOs had particularly...