Limited liability creates a conflict of interests between policyholders and shareholders of insurance companies. It provides shareholders with incentives to increase the risk of the insurer's assets and liabilities which, in turn, might reduce the value policyholders attach to and premiums they...

Some investment advisors offer multiple versions of a fund with the same manager and highly correlated returns. But these “twin” funds are separate portfolios for different investors with differing abilities to select and monitor managers. Using a matched sample of retail and institutional...

This paper examines the role of bond ratings and the effects of rating-based regulations in the corporate bond market. Exploiting an unanticipated mechanical change in how the benchmark Lehman bond indices are constructed in 2005, we show that rating-induced market segmentation of the bond...

Natural catastrophes attract regularly the attention of media and have become a source of public concern. From a financial viewpoint, natural catastrophes represent idiosyncratic risks, diversifiable at the world level. But for reasons analyzed in this paper reinsurance markets are unable to...

In the standard model for insurance demand, the risk is totally exogenous and the insurance premium is paid for out of riskless wealth. This model yields results that are mostly in contradiction to everyday observation and have been used to question the pertinence of expected utility theory on...

This study yields a contribution to a better understanding of the interest rate sensitivity of real estate and should enable a more sophisticated interest rate risk management, especially for insurance companies and pension funds. This is achieved by modelling the whole life of a typical but...

We investigate whether corporate finance incentives aect the extent of corporate hedging with property insurance. Using a database that contains detailed insurance information, we show that rms buy property insurance to reduce the expected costs of distress. Further, we document a scale effect:...

This paper develops a tractable real options framework to analyze the effects of asymmetric information on investment and financing decisions when firms require external funds to finance investment. Our analysis shows that corporate insiders can signal their private information to outside...

This paper examines the impact of managerial entrenchment on corporate financing decisions. We build a dynamic contingent claims model in which financing policy results from a trade-off between tax benefits, agency conflicts, and contracting frictions. In our setting, managers do not act in the...

Cooper and Nyborg (2008) derive a tax-adjusted discount rate formula under a constant proportion leverage policy, investor taxes and risky debt. However, their analysis assumes zero recovery in default. We extend their framework to allow for positive recovery rates. We also allow for differences...