This paper examines the impact of managerial entrenchment on corporate financing decisions. We build a dynamic contingent claims model in which financing policy results from a trade-off between tax benefits, agency conflicts, and contracting frictions. In our setting, managers do not act in the...

This paper develops a tractable real options framework to analyze the effects of asymmetric information on investment and financing decisions when firms require external funds to finance investment. Our analysis shows that corporate insiders can signal their private information to outside...

Cooper and Nyborg (2008) derive a tax-adjusted discount rate formula under a constant proportion leverage policy, investor taxes and risky debt. However, their analysis assumes zero recovery in default. We extend their framework to allow for positive recovery rates. We also allow for differences...

This paper develops a signalling game in which the decision to raise public equity is a real option of the firm. Firms may use multiple signals to reveal their type: the timing of the IPO, the fraction of shares issued and the underpricing of shares. The model provides a tractable approach for...

We develop a model of investment, payout, and nancing policies in which rms face uncertainty regarding their ability to raise funds and have to search for investors when in need of capital. We show that capital supply uncertainty leads rms to value nancial slack and to adjust their policies to...

This paper develops a real options framework to analyze the behavior of stock returns in mergers and acquisitions. In this framework, the timing and terms of takeovers are endogenous and result from value-maximizing decisions. The implications of the model for abnormal announcement returns are...

This paper deals with efficient estimation in exchangeable nonlinear dynamic panel models with common unobservable factor. The specification accounts for both micro- and macro-dynamics, induced by the lagged individual observation and the common stochastic factor, respectively. For large...

Ambiguity aversion in dynamic models is motivated by the presence of unknown time-varying features, which agents do not understand and cannot theorize about. We analyze the consequences of this assumption for economic agents and model builders, who typically need to estimate a model, e.g., to...

Estimates of agents' risk aversion dier between market studies and experimental studies. We demonstrate that the estimates can be reconciled through consistent treatment of agents' tendency for narrow framing, regarding integration of background wealth as well as across risky outcomes: Risk...