We provide novel evidence on voting practices used by the investment committees of prominent venture capital investors in the U.S. A substantial share of these VCs use a voting rule for seed and early stage investments where a single `champion' is sufficient for the entire partnership to make an...

We consider the provision of venture capital in a dynamic agency model. In particular, we focus on the interaction between venture capital financing and product market competition: A young firm with a risky innovation project attempts to enter a market where it faces two periods of price...

Past work has shown that failure tolerance by principals has the potential to stimulate innovation, but has not examined how this affects which projects principals will start. We demonstrate that failure tolerance has an equilibrium price ― in terms of an investor's required share of equity...

Innovative Unternehmensgründungen werden in zunehmendem Maße von Venture Capital (VC) Gesellschaften finanziert, die mit dem Gebrauch spezieller Finanzierungsinstrumente die diversen Agencyprobleme dieser Situation zu bewältigen versuchen. Dieses Papier gibt einen Überblick über die...