As the healthcare sector grows in significance due to social and technical developments the EU competition rules are likely to be more frequently applied to healthcare both as a result of the broad interpretation of the concept of undertaking and because the applicable antitrust rules are since...

We study antitrust enforcement in which the fine must obey four legal principles: punishments should fit the crime, proportionality, bankruptcy considerations, and minimum fines. We integrate these legal principles into an infinitely-repeated oligopoly model. Bankruptcy considerations ensure...

This paper develops a model of the birth and death of cartels in the presence of enforcement activities by a Competition Authority (CA). We distinguish three sets of interventions: (a) detecting, prosecuting and penalising cartels; (b) actions that aim to stop cartel activity in the short-term,...

In Katsoulacos, Motchenkova and Ulph (2015) we examined the welfare properties of a number of monetary penalty regimes for tackling cartels, including revenue-based penalties (the most widely used regime), illegal gains-based penalties, and overcharge-based penalties. We showed that the latter...

In this paper we set out the welfare economics based case for imposing cartel penalties on the cartel overcharge rather than on the more conventional bases of revenue or profits (illegal gains). To do this we undertake a systematic comparison of a penalty based on the cartel overcharge with...

We study the impact of legal principles on the design and the effectiveness of antitrust fines. Modern antitrust enforcement obeys four basic legal principles: punishments should fit the crime, proportionality, bankruptcy considerations, and minimum fines. We integrate these principles into a...

We study antitrust enforcement in which the fine must obey four legal principles: punishments should fit the crime, proportionality, bankruptcy considerations, and minimum fines. We integrate these legal principles into an infinitely-repeated oligopoly model, where bankruptcy considerations...

Critics such as Fritz Scharpf maintain that in the EU negative integration (abolishing national rules) by definition wins out over positive integration (adopting new EU rules). This claim is examined here regarding public services – both utilities and welfare services. In EU law the (partly...

This paper describes the privatisation and deregulation programs in the Netherlands during the period 1982-2002, that is, under the governments headed by Lubbers (1982-1994) and Kok (1994-2002). The paper explains that the Dutch define privatisation as "making use of private interests and market...

Corporatism, or private interest government, raises objections both from a democratic and from an economic perspective. This paper examines the application of EU competition law to private rule making that is purportedly in the public interest. Earlier case law holding Member States responsible...