The European natural gas market is characterized by declining indigenous resources, particularly in the UK and the Netherlands, and a growing dependence on a small number of large exporters who, as a consequence, see their market power increasing. In this paper we analyze long-run scenarios for...

We model the optimal regulation of continuous, irreversible, capacity expansion, in a model in which the regulated network firm has private information about its capacity costs, investments need to be financed out of the firm's cash flows from selling network access and demand is stochastic. If...

We study a buyer's optimal investment strategy for new technologies when costs evolve stochastically and are private information to the suppliers. In a continuous time setting, we show how the asymmetric information on the stochastic variables leads to delays in investment compared to the real...

We study downstream entry and capacity choice in the market for wireless elecommunications, where licenses to use radio spectrum - an essential input - are in the hands of vertically integrated oligopolists. Prior to network construction these incumbents may offer contracts for capacity to an...

We consider a market with concentrated domestic buyers and concentrated foreign sellers and explore the extent to which domestic regulation helps to increase the buyers' countervailing power against the foreign sellers. We use the Shapley value to describe the distribution of the trade surplus...

When a monopolist has discretion over the timing of infrastructure investments, regulation of post-investment prices interferes with incentivizing socially optimal investment timing. In a model of regulated lumpy investment under uncertainty, we study regulation when the regulator can condition...

We study incentives of banks to reserve liquidity given that they can rely on the interbank market to mitigate crisis-related liquidity shocks. Banks can partially pledge their assets to each other, but not to the rest of the economy. Therefore liquidity provision is endogenous. We show that if...