In this paper, we define a modification of the Shapley value for the model of TU games with a priori unions. We provide two characterizations of this value and a new characterization of the Banzhaf–Owen coalitional value. Copyright Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa 2014

The study of 1-convex/1-concave TU games possessing a nonempty core and for which the nucleolus is linear was initiated by Driessen and Tijs (Methods Oper. Res. 46:395–406, <CitationRef CitationID="CR2">1983</CitationRef>) and Driessen (OR Spectrum 7:19–26, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">1985</CitationRef>). However, until recently appealing abstract and practical examples of...</citationref></citationref>

In this paper we introduce and characterize two new values for cooperative transferable utility games with graph restricted communication and a priori unions. Both values are obtained by applying the Shapley value to an associated TU-game. The graph-partition restricted TU-game is obtained by...