This paper analyzes the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is...

This paper provides a review of the recent literature on how incentives in unemployment insurance (UI) can be improved. We are particularly concerned with three instruments, viz. the duration of benefit payments (or more generally the time sequencing of benefits), monitoring in conjunction with...

This paper investigates four topics. (1) It examines the different roles played by the propensity score (probabilitiy of selection) in matching, instrumental variable and control functions methods. (2) It contrasts the roles of exclusion restrictions in matching and selection models. (3) It...

Using a unique micro panel data set we investigate whether active labor market programs improve employment prospects and increase mobility in the longer run. We consider two prototype programs: job creation programs and training programs. We find that both programs reduce the chances of finding...