A decision maker faces a decision problem, or a game against nature. For each probability distribution over the state of the world (nature`s strategies), she has a weak order over her acts (pure strategies). We formulate conditions on these weak orders guaranteeing that they can be jointly...

This note provides an axiomatic derivation of a case-based decision rule. It shows that, if preferences orders over available acts in various contexts satisfy certain consistency requirements, then these orders can be numerically represented by maximizationof a similarity-weighted utility function.

A predictor is asked to rank eventualities according to their plausibility, based on past cases. We assume that she can form a ranking given any memory that consists of finitely many past cases. Mild consistency requirements on these rankings imply that they have a numerical representation via a...

The art of rhetoric may be defined as changing other people`s minds (opinions, beliefs) without providing them new information. One technique heavily used by rhetoric employs analogies. Using analogies, one may draw the listener`s attention to similarities between cases and to re-organize...

A predictor is asked to rank eventualities according to their plausibility, based on past cases. We assume that she can form a ranking given any memory that consists of repetitions of past cases.

Prediction is based on past cases. We assume that a predictor can rank eventualities according to their plausibility given any memory that consists of repetitions of past cases. In a companion paper, we show that under mild consistency requirements, these rankings can be represented by numerical...

Several authors have indicated a contradiction between consistent aggregation of subjective beliefs and tastes, and a Pareto condition. We argue that the Pareto condition that implies the contradiction is not compelling. Society should not necessarily endorse a unanimous choice when it is based...

We study the Nash bargaining solution of a problem in which two agents bargain over an uncertain outcome. Under the assumptions of risk neutrality and of constant absolute risk aversion, we study the way that solution varies, ex ante, when we vary the beliefs of one agent. Changing an agent`s...