In the Rothschild-Stiglitz [1976] model of a competitive insurance market with adverse selection, pooling equilibria cannot exist. However in practice, pooling contracts are frequent, notably in health insurance and life insurance. This is due to the fact that distribution costs are...

There is no consensus among health economists about the specification of individual preferences that best fits observed behaviors. One crucial point of disagreement concerns the sign of the interaction between health and wealth in individual utility functions. We propose here a simple, static,...

We extend the familiar income taxation model à la Mirrlees, so as to include income uncertainty, due for instance to a risk of illness. Following a line of research initiated by Blomqvist and Horn [1984] we prove that the existence of a Social Health Insurance system may be justified even when...

Using a pricing formula for options on coupon bonds (Jamshidian [1989], El Karoui and Rochet [1990]) we are able to compute the actuarial pricing of deposit insurance for a commercial bank. Our formula takes into account the maturity structure of the bank's balance sheet, as well as market...

We introduce profit taxation in Borch's [1962] model of a competitive insurance market. We analyze the impact of taxation on equilibrium prices and characterize the cases where optimal risk sharing is preserved. In the case of Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility functions, this...