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Optimal incentive schemes when only the agents "best" output matters to the principal
Levitt, Steven D. - In: The Rand journal of economics 26 (1995) 4, pp. 744-760
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001333864
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Is no news bad news? Information transmission and the role of "early warning" in the principal-agent model
Levitt, Steven D. - In: The Rand journal of economics 28 (1997) 4, pp. 641-661
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001231003
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Is No News Bad News? Information Transmission and the Role of "Early Warning" in the Principal-Agent Model
Levitt, Steven D.; Snyder, Christopher M. - In: The Rand journal of economics 28 (1997) 4, pp. 641-661
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007697970
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Optimal Incentive Schemes When Only the Agents' "Best" Output Matters to the Principal
Levitt, Steven D. - In: The Rand journal of economics 26 (1995) 4, pp. 744-760
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007629397