In general in organizations whose system of governance involves weighted majority voting, power and voting weight … differ. Power indices are a value concept for majority voting games which provide a means of analyzing this difference. This …) and applies them to the voting distribution in the two governing bodies of the IMF each year since its foundation. …

This paper compares the theoretical bases of the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices of voting power for a legislature … with weighted voting. Definitions based on probabilistic-voting assumptions, useful both as behavioral descriptions and for … computation in empirical applications, are compared in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions on the choice of voting …

Voting Power Indices enable the analysis of the distribution of power in a legislature or voting body which uses … weighted voting. Although the approach, based on co-operative game theory, has been known for a long time it has not been very …

This paper assesses the indices against a set of reasonable criteria in terms of shareholder voting power and the … control of the corporation in a large cross section of British companies. Each company is a separate voting body and there is … much variation in the distribution of voting shares among them. Moreover reasonable criteria exist against which to judge …

This paper examines the system of Qualified Majority Voting, used by the Council of Ministers of the European Union … Coleman to make two analyses: (1) the question of the voting power of member countries from the point of view of fairness, and …

We develop a definition of equilibrium for agenda formation in general voting settings. The definition is independent … of any protocol. We show that the set of equilibrium outcomes for any Pareto efficient voting rule is uniquely determined …. We also show that for such voting rules, if preferences are strict then the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with …

In general in an organization whose system of governance involves weighted voting, a member's weight in terms of the …

We consider renegotiation of social earnings insurance arrangements by majority voting in an economy where ex …-ante identical individuals make unobservable private investments in education. We show that voting-based renegotiation can result in …

voting games. For K > 3 alternatives and n > 3 voters, we find sufficient conditions for the game to be dominance … large, "almost all" games can be classified as either DS or not DS. If the game is DS, a Condorcet Winner always exists when … n > 4, and the outcome is always the Condorcet Winner when the electorate is sufficiently replicated. …

In a model of majority voting with common values and costly but voluntary participation, we show that in the vicinity … negative voting externality identified by Borgers(2001) in the context of private values is always dominated by a positive … informational externality. In addition, we show that multiple Pareto-ranked voting equilibria may exist and moreover, majority …