Showing 1 - 7 of 7
This paper studies the optimal design of dynamic research contests. We introduce interim transfers, which are paid in every period while the contest is ongoing, to an otherwise standard setting. We show that a contest where: (i) the principal can stop the contest in any period, (ii) a constant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012056815
This paper analyzes the design of innovation contests when the quality of an innovation depends on the research …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011993818
This paper provides a theory of strategic innovation project choice by incumbents and start-ups. We show that … prohibiting killer acquisitions strictly reduces the variety of innovation projects. By contrast, we find that prohibiting other … acquisitions only has a weakly negative innovation effect, and we provide conditions under which the effect is zero. Furthermore …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012284781
This paper provides a theory of strategic innovation project choice by incumbents and start-ups which serves as a …, prohibiting acquisitions has a weakly negative overall innovation effect. We provide conditions determining the size of the effect …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014333779
This paper analyzes the design of innovation contests when the quality of an innovation depends on the research …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011784283
literature, which focuses only on the level of investment in innovation, this model captures both the variety of research …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316823
This paper provides a theory of strategic innovation project choice by incumbents and start-ups which serves as a … foundation for the analysis of acquisition policy. We show that prohibiting acquisitions has a weakly negative innovation effect …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012588494