Narrow search
Showing 1 - 3 of 3
Cover Image
Persuasion and dynamic communication
Sher, Itai - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 1
A speaker attempts to persuade a listener to accept a request by presenting evidence. A persuasion rule specifies what evidence is persuasive. This paper compares static and dynamic rules. We present a single linear program (i) whose solution corresponds to the listener's optimal dynamic rule...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738407
Cover Image
Price discrimination through communication
Sher, Itai; Vohra, Rakesh - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2
We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value. We show that a condition very close to transparency of buyer segments is necessary and sufficient for the optimal mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010777681
Cover Image
Reputation without commitment in finitely-repeated games
Yildiz, Muhamet; Weinstein, Jonathan - In: Theoretical Economics (2015)
In the reputation literature, players have \emph{commitment types} which represent the possibility that they do not … commitment types can emerge from incomplete information about the stage payoffs. In particular, any finitely repeated game with … commitment types is strategically equivalent to a standard finitely repeated game with incomplete information about the stage …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011127591