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Reason-based choice: a bargaining rationale for the attraction and compromise effects
de Clippel, Geoffroy; Eliaz, Kfir - In: Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) 1
solution to an intra-personal bargaining problem among different selves of an individual, where each self represents a … coincide with our bargaining solution, for some pair of preference relations. Second, we provide a revealed …-preference foundation to our bargaining solution and characterize the extent to which these two preference relations can be uniquely …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008800997
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Reason-based choice: a bargaining rationale for the attraction and compromise effects
de Clippel, Geoffroy; Eliaz, Kfir - In: Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) 1, pp. 125-162
solution to an intra-personal bargaining problem among different selves of an individual, where each self represents a … coincide with our bargaining solution, for some pair of preference relations. Second, we provide a revealed …-preference foundation to our bargaining solution and characterize the extent to which these two preference relations can be uniquely …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599458
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Transparency and price formation
Kaya, Ayça; Liu, Qingmin - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2
bargaining model of price formation with asymmetric information. Under natural assumptions on type distributions, and for any …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010765118
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Transparency and price formation
Kaya, Ayça; Liu, Qingmin - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 2, pp. 341-383
bargaining model of price formation with asymmetric information. Under natural assumptions on type distributions, and for any …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599543
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Alternating-offer bargaining with the global games information structure
Tsoy, Anton - In: Theoretical Economics 13 (2018) 2, pp. 869-931
In this study, I examine the alternating-offer bilateral bargaining model with private correlated values. The … limits and show that it is efficient, but the surplus split generally differs from the Nash bargaining split. I then … construct a double limit that approximates the Nash bargaining split in the ex post surplus, but with a delay. Further, I prove …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010046
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Learning by matching
Chen, Yi-chun; Hu, Gaoji - In: Theoretical Economics 15 (2020) 1, pp. 29-56
This paper studies a stability notion and matching processes in the job market with incomplete information on the workers' side. Each worker is associated with a type, and each firm cares about the type of her employee under a match. Moreover, firms' information structure is described by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215321
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Optimal deadlines for agreements
Damiano, Ettore; Li, Hao; Suen, Wing - In: Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) 2
. Extending the deadline hurts the players in the first case but is beneficial in the second. When the initial conflict between …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009216675
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Optimal deadlines for agreements
Damiano, Ettore; Li, Hao; Suen, Wing - In: Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) 2, pp. 357-393
. Extending the deadline hurts the players in the first case but is beneficial in the second. When the initial conflict between …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599465
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Negotiation across multiple issues
Persitz, Dotan; Gayer, Gabrielle - In: Theoretical Economics 11 (2016) 3, pp. 937-969
In the present work, agreement on allocation of payments from multiple issues requires unanimous consent of all parties involved. The agents are assumed to know the aggregate payoffs but do not know their decomposition by issues. This framework applies to many real-world problems, such as the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599589
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The dynamics of instability
Barilla, César; Gonçalves, Duarte - In: Theoretical Economics 19 (2024) 1, pp. 365-405
We study a model in which two players with opposing interests try to alter a status quo through instability-generating actions. We show that instability can be used to secure longer-term durable changes, even if it is costly to generate and does not generate short-term gains. In equilibrium,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536977