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Monitoring experts
Azrieli, Yaron - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1313-1350
We study the design of contracts that incentivize experts to collect information and truthfully report it to a decision maker. We depart from most of the previous literature by assuming that the transfers cannot depend on the realized state or on the ex post payoff of the decision maker. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189061
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Mechanism design and communication networks
Tomala, Tristan; Renou, Ludovic - In: Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) 3, pp. 489-533
couple encryption techniques together with appropriate incentives to secure the transmission of each player's private …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599469
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Termination as an incentive device
Grochulski, Borys; Zhang, Yuzhe - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 1, pp. 381-419
incentives to be restored without terminating. If the agent's outside option is low, suspension is ineffective because it …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537032
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Mechanism design and communication networks
Tomala, Tristan; Renou, Ludovic - In: Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) 3
couple encryption techniques together with appropriate incentives to secure the transmission of each player's private …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009209872
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Private and public liquidity provision in over-the-counter markets
Arseneau, David M.; Rappoport, David E.; Vardoulakis, … - In: Theoretical Economics 15 (2020) 4, pp. 1669-1712
We show that trade frictions in OTC markets result in inefficient private liquidity provision. We develop a dynamic model of market-based financial intermediation with a two-way interaction between primary credit markets and secondary OTC markets. Private allocations are generically inefficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189011
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Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability
Ely, Jeffrey C.; Peski, Marcin - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 1, pp. 19-65
In games with incomplete information, conventional hierarchies of belief are incomplete as descriptions of the players' information for the purposes of determining a player's behavior. We show by example that this is true for a variety of solution concepts. We then investigate what is essential...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599364
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Information, evolution and utility
Swinkels, Jeroen M.; Samuelson, Larry - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 1, pp. 119-142
Human utility embodies a number of seemingly irrational aspects. The leading example in this paper is that utilities often depend on the presence of salient unchosen alternatives. Our focus is to understand <i>why</i> an evolutionary process might optimally lead to such seemingly dysfunctional features...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599367
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Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 3, pp. 311-340
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public …. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent … sufficient to determine behavior). We show that, in games with general almost-public private monitoring, this is essentially the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599373
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A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach
Rubinstein, Ariel; Glazer, Jacob - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 4, pp. 395-410
A speaker wishes to persuade a listener to take a certain action. The conditions under which the request is justified, from the listener’s point of view, depend on the state of the world, which is known only to the speaker. Each state is characterized by a set of statements from which the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599376
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Efficiency in repeated trade with hidden valuations
Athey, Susan; Miller, David A. - In: Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) 3, pp. 299-354
We analyze the extent to which efficient trade is possible in an ongoing relationship between impatient agents with hidden valuations (i.i.d. over time), restricting attention to equilibria that satisfy ex post incentive constraints in each period. With ex ante budget balance, efficient trade...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599391