We analyze the structure of a society driven by power relations. Our model has an exogenous power relation over the set of coalitions of agents. Agents determine the social order by forming coalitions. The power relations determine the ranking of agents in society for any social order. We study...

We model an individual who wants to learn about a state of the world. The individual has a prior belief, and has data which consists of multiple forecasts about the state of the world. Our key assumption is that the decision maker identifies explanations that could have generated this data and...

We model an individual who wants to learn about a state of the world. The individual has a prior belief and has data that consist of multiple forecasts about the state of the world. Our key assumption is that the decision maker identifies explanations that could have generated this data and...

We analyze the structure of a society driven by power relations. Our model has an exogenous power relation over the set of coalitions of agents. Agents determine the social order by forming coalitions. The power relations determine the ranking of agents in society for any social order. We study...

We study a dynamic matching environment where individuals arrive sequentially. There is a tradeoff between waiting for a thicker market, allowing for higher-quality matches, and minimizing agents' waiting costs. The optimal mechanism cumulates a stock of incongruent pairs up to a threshold and...

We study a dynamic matching environment where individuals arrive sequentially. There is a trade‐off between waiting for a thicker market, allowing for higher‐quality matches, and minimizing agents' waiting costs. The optimal mechanism cumulates a stock of incongruent pairs up to a threshold...