Showing 1 - 10 of 33
We study learning in a large class of complete information normal form games. Players continually face new strategic situations and must form beliefs by extrapolation from similar past situations. We characterize the long-run outcomes of learning in terms of iterated dominance in a related...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599409
Global games with endogenous information often exhibit multiple equilibria. In this paper we show how one can nevertheless identify useful predictions that are robust across all equilibria and that could not have been delivered in the common-knowledge counterparts of these games. Our analysis is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599503
Consider the problem of maximizing the revenue from selling a number of goods to a single buyer. We show that, unlike the case of one good, when the buyer's values for the goods increase the seller's maximal revenue may well decrease. We then identify two circumstances where monotonicity does...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599558
Modern economies rely heavily on their infrastructure networks. These networks face threats ranging from natural disasters to human attacks. As networks are pervasive, the investments needed to protect them are very large; this motivates the study of targeted defense. What are the 'key' nodes to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010071
This paper suggests a novel way to import the approach of axiomatic theories of individual choice into strategic settings and demonstrates the benefits of this approach. We propose both a tractable behavioral model as well as axioms applied to the behavior of the collection of players, focusing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010087
In order to identify expertise, forecasters should not be tested by their calibration score, which can always be made arbitrarily small, but rather by their Brier score. The Brier score is the sum of the calibration score and the refinement score; the latter measures how good the sorting into...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536942
Objects of different quality are to be allocated to agents. Agents can receive at most one object, and there are not enough high-quality objects for every agent. The value to the social planner from allocating objects to any given agent depends on that agent's private information. The social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536950
We study information design with multiple privately informed agents who interact in a game. Each agent's utility is linear in a real-valued state. We show that there always exists an optimal mechanism which is laminar partitional and bound its ``complexity''. For each type profile, such a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536996
A planner wants to elicit information about an agent's preference relation, but not the entire ordering. Specifically, preferences are grouped into "types", and the planner only wants to elicit the agent's type. We first assume beliefs about randomization are subjective, and show that a space of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189077
Consider the problem of maximizing the revenue from selling a number of goods to a single buyer. We show that, unlike the case of one good, when the buyer's values for the goods increase the seller's maximal revenue may well decrease. We then identify two circumstances where monotonicity does...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010940429