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Cho, Wonki Jo; Ju, Biung-Ghi - In: Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) 2, pp. 513-531

Group identification refers to the problem of classifying individuals into groups (e.g., racial or ethnic classification). We consider a multinary group identification model where memberships to three or more groups are simultaneously determined based on individual opinions on who belong to what...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010076

The winner-take-all dilemma

Kikuchi, Kazuya; Koriyama, Yukio - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 3, pp. 917-940

We consider collective decision making when society consists of groups endowed with voting weights. Each group chooses …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536980

Rationalizable voting

Kalandrakis, Tasos - In: Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) 1, pp. 93-125

When is a finite number of binary voting choices consistent with the hypothesis that the voter has preferences that … voting decisions. Without knowledge of the location of the voting alternatives, voting decisions by multiple voters impose no … joint testable restrictions on the location of their ideal points, even in one dimension. Furthermore, the voting records of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599425

Rationalizable voting

Kalandrakis, Tasos - In: Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) 1

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008545873

A resurrection of the Condorcet Jury Theorem

Szentes, Balazs; Koriyama, Yukio - In: Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) 2, pp. 227-252

This paper analyzes the optimal size of a deliberating committee where (i) there is no conflict of interest among individuals and (ii) information acquisition is costly. The committee members simultaneously decide whether to acquire information, and then make the ex-post efficient decision. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599420

Condorcet meets Ellsberg

Ellis, Andrew - In: Theoretical Economics 11 (2016) 3, pp. 865-895

studies strategic voting when voters have pure common values but may be ambiguity averse -- exhibit Ellsberg-type behavior …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599587

Information aggregation in Poisson elections

Ekmekci, Mehmet; Lauermann, Stephan - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 1, pp. 1-23

The modern Condorcet jury theorem states that under weak conditions, when voters have common interests, elections will aggregate information when the population is large, in any equilibrium. Here, we study the performance of large elections with population uncertainty. We find that the modern...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189048

A resurrection of the Condorcet Jury Theorem

Szentes, Balazs; Koriyama, Yukio - In: Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) 2

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005256847

Can intergenerational equity be operationalized?

Zame, William R. - In: Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) 2, pp. 187-202

A long Utilitarian tradition has the ideal of equal regard for all individuals, both those now living and those yet to be born. The literature formalizes this ideal as asking for a preference relation on the space of infinite utility streams that is complete, transitive, invariant to finite...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599387

The ex-ante aggregation of opinions under uncertainty

Nascimento, Leandro - In: Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) 3, pp. 535-570

This paper presents an analysis of the problem of aggregating preference orderings under subjective uncertainty. Individual preferences, or opinions, agree on the ranking of risky prospects, but are quite general because we do not specify the perception of ambiguity or the attitude towards it. A...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599470