What are the value and form of optimal persuasion when information can be generated only slowly? We study this question … in a dynamic model in which a `sender' provides public information over time subject to a graduality constraint, and a … sender's equilibrium value function and information provision. We show that the graduality constraint inhibits information …

signaling subgame. Thus, in addition to its direct effect on the receiver's information, a test has an indirect effect through … grade inflation and information coarsening. …

using promise of future payments and information gathering. The agent's effort incrementally advances production and such … advance is a prerequisite for gathering new information. The principal decides how much information to gather based on these …

Mean-preserving contractions are critical for studying Bayesian models of information design. We introduce the class of …

We show that information exchange via disclosure is possible in equilibrium even when it is certain that whenever one … disclosure -- the screening motive. Alternating and gradual disclosures are generally indispensable for information exchange and … the number of disclosure rounds grows without bound if the agents' initial information becomes sufficiently diffuse -- in …

information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers can improve welfare if the receiver cares more about the decision and …. We derive a multistage information elicitation mechanism without commitment that can be more beneficial to the receiver …

An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a privately informed receiver … willing to act. Using a linear programming approach, I characterize optimal information disclosure and provide conditions … not monotonic in the precision of the receiver's private information. …